Abstract--A class of RSA encryption exponents whose corresponding decryption exponents have a bitlength almost equal to the bitlength of the RSA modulus is analysed. In this way, the attacks to small decryption exponent are avoided. (~) 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Hence, the greatest value that k can reach is k = e -1. Moreover, as e _> 3, for k = e -1 we obtain d= l+(e-el)¢(n) > 1-¢(n)_> 5¢(n)"
We are indebted to Professor A. J. 
(a) We have p = e% + rp, with % E N. As p is a prime, it follows that rp E Z~. Moreover, we have p -1 = eap + rp -1. As gcd(e,p -1) = 1, we also conclude gcd(e, rp -1) = 1. Hence, if every prime factor of e goes to c~, then the probability of finding a residue in Se goes to 1. (ii) If e is a prime, then Ne = e -2. (iii) If e --3 m, then Are = (1/2) ¢(e).
1. Encryption exponents whose associated decryption exponent is of the same size as the RSA modulus can be chosen arbitrarily. Once an e is selected, the only constraint is to take p and q satisfying items (a) and (b) in the previous proposition, which only affect the residues of p and q modulo e. Moreover, as the map x ~-~ x/(x -1) is an involution, the residues rp and rq play a completely symmetric role. Hence, for every rp E Se corresponds Large Decryption Exponents Table 1 shows the pairs (rp, rq) for several values of e.
2. If e is a prime number, then p can be chosen arbitrarily and q is only conditioned to satisfy equation (1) . We remark that Ne is as large as possible when e is a prime. On the other hand, if e is a composite number, then Ne may be much smaller than e -2, thus, imposing more constraints to select p and q than in the prime case.
3. If e = 3, there are no constraints on p and q, as in this case, we have rp = rq = 2 for every pair p, q satisfying the RSA conditions.
